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The social brain hypothesis proposes that enlarged brains have evolved in response to
the increasing cognitive demands that complex social life in larger groups places on
primates and other mammals. However, this reasoning can be challenged by evidence
that brain size has decreased in the evolutionary transitions from solitary to social larger
groups in the case of Neolithic humans and some eusocial insects. Different hypotheses
can be identified in the literature to explain this reduction in brain size. We evaluate some
of them from the perspective of recent approaches to cognitive science, which support
the idea that the basis of cognition can span over brain, body, and environment. Here
we show through a minimal cognitive model using an evolutionary robotics methodology
that the neural complexity, in terms of neural entropy and degrees of freedom of neural
activity, of smaller-brained agents evolved in social interaction is comparable to the neural
complexity of larger-brained agents evolved in solitary conditions. The nonlinear time
series analysis of agents’ neural activity reveals that the decoupled smaller neural network
is intrinsically lower dimensional than the decoupled larger neural network. However,
when smaller-brained agents are interacting, their actual neural complexity goes beyond
its intrinsic limits achieving results comparable to those obtained by larger-brained solitary
agents. This suggests that the smaller-brained agents are able to enhance their neural
complexity through social interaction, thereby offsetting the reduced brain size.
Keywords: agent-based modeling, social interaction, complexity, entropy, social brains, evolutionary robotics,
continuous-time recurrent neural network, nonlinear time series analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
It is widely accepted that increased social group size is an important factor for explaining the
evolution of increased brain size in primates, because of a concomitant increase in the cognitive
demands posed by more complex forms of social competition and/or social bonding (Byrne, 1996;
Dunbar and Shultz, 2007). However, this social brain hypothesis has come under pressure from
various directions. Brain tissue is energetically expensive, and so primate brain size can only
increase as an adaptive response to increased cognitive demands if such growth is enabled by a
sufficiently high-quality diet. In fact, diet seems to be the primary factor that predicts brain size
in primates (DeCasien et al., 2017). In this context the evolution of human brain size during the
Paleolithic period can then be seen as fueled by the development of cooking, which significantly
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enhanced our energy intake and brought along with it an increase
in cognitive and social complexity (Wrangham, 2009; Herculano-
Houzel, 2016).
It might therefore be expected that during the subsequent
Neolithic period, with the advent of domestication, agriculture,
and settled living in ever larger groups, human brain size will
have continued to increase or at least remained stable. However,
the opposite tendency has been observed: during this time
period around the world, human brain size underwent a notable
reduction beyond that expected from an overall reduction in
body size (Brown, 1987; Henneberg, 1988; Henneberg and Steyn,
1993; Brown and Maeda, 2004). In particular, reduction in
cranial capacity is associated with the highest levels of population
density, coinciding with the emergence of larger, socially, and
economically organized ways of life that mark the start of the
Neolithic period (Bailey and Geary, 2009). The overall extent
of the reduction is controversial (Leach, 2003), but according
to some estimates it is comparable in extent to the increase in
brain size associated with previous speciation events in human
evolution (Henneberg, 2006).
Although this curious fact about the most recent period
of human brain evolution has so far received less attention,
several hypotheses have been developed to account for it. These
hypotheses can be grouped into two broad categories depending
on whether they appeal to an increase in selection pressures
favoring smaller brains or to a decrease in selection pressures
favoring bigger brains. The former category includes selection
pressure on improved brain efficiency, and more prominently
the self-domestication hypothesis, which has proposed that there
was an increase in selection pressure for reducing in-group
competition (Hare et al., 2012; Hare, 2017), which has led to the
prediction of reduced cranial capacity inHolocene humans (Cieri
et al., 2014), as this is also observed in other domesticated animals
(Leach, 2003).
Alternatively, it could be that domesticated ways of life placed
fewer cognitive demands on individuals’ brains, which would
then put this hypothesis in the latter category. Indeed, rather
than just reducing cognitive demands, the human sociocultural
environment makes cognition more efficient and more complex
(Clark, 2006; Sterelny, 2017). Human evolution is characterized
by an increase in sociocultural scaffolding of learning and
apprenticeship (Sterelny, 2012), and so it makes sense that the
increase in social institutions in the Neolithic period permitted
the human brain of “doing more with less” size (Bednarik,
2014). Hodder (2020) jokingly refers to this possibility as the
“smart phones, dumb people” syndrome. To be more precise, the
latest theoretical developments in cognitive science promote an
embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive (“4E”) approach
to the mind (Newen et al., 2018), which argues that the basis
of cognition is not limited to the brain but can spread out over
brain, body, and environment. On this view, cognitive processes
are underdetermined by brain structure, which undermines the
underlying assumption of the social brain hypothesis (Barrett
et al., 2007; Barona, 2021). Living in a world of enhanced
sociocultural scaffolding of cognition would permit brains to
become smaller but, importantly, without a reduction in overall
cognitive capacity of the appropriately scaffolded person. We
could call this the social scaffolding hypothesis for decreased
brain size.
Interestingly, a similar distributed cognition hypothesis has
been proposed for the case of eusocial insects: in wasps, the
strongest changes in brain investment, namely a reduction in
central processing brain regions, accompanied the evolutionary
transition from solitary to social species but did not correlate
specifically with the degree of social complexity (O’Donnell et al.,
2015). More generally, the evolution of insect societies appears
to have occurred without the evolution of any new dedicated
neural structures (Farris, 2016). Reasons for this are unclear,
but a computational model suggests that there may be energetic
advantages to optimizing total colony brain mass over individual
brain mass (Feinerman and Traniello, 2016).
This suggests a more general hypothesis for decreased brain
size, in which the key explanatory factor is not the complexity
of the social world per se, but rather a more general principle of
decreased in-group conflict and increased possibilities of relying
on responsive others. In the case of insect colonies, this is
achieved by the colony serving as an extended phenotype of
the reproductive individuals, with most individuals being closely
related to each other. In the Neolithic period human groups
could no longer rely on such genetic relatedness for in-group
support, but they were able to expand in size from extended
family groups to large villages by developing new symbolic forms
of group identification. This allowed unfamiliar individuals with
a shared symbolic identity to rely on each other for support,
based on early developing mutual socio-moral expectations
(Jin and Baillargeon, 2017).
However, in general it remains unclear whether the brain
size reduction associated with the evolution of such large, yet
tightly integrated and highly coordinated in-groups is better
characterized as a case of “smart phone, dumb user” or of “doing
more with less.” In other words, is it the case that brain size could
decrease because it was possible for brain activity to become
less complex (“dumb”) due to a reduction of cognitive demands
in the social milieu (highly dependable and organized “smart”
society)? Or could it also be the case that brain size could
decrease because brain activity became more complex due to
the cognitive scaffolding provided by that reliable social milieu?
That is, a smaller brain could be producing activity at least
equal in complexity to a larger brain (“doing more processing
with less resources”) because it became supported by extended
social structures. It is difficult to empirically arbitrate between
these two possibilities. One piece of evidence in support of
the latter possibility is that during human evolution the brain’s
blood flow rate, which is indicative of levels of neural activity,
has increased faster than brain size (Seymour et al., 2016). But
also, more theoretical work is needed to deepen our conceptual
understanding of how brains could do more with less during
social interaction.
2. METHODS
In the following we will explore these questions by employing the
synthetic approach to studying adaptive behavior based on agent-
basedmodeling, evolutionary algorithms, and dynamical systems
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analysis (Cliff et al., 1993; Beer, 1997; Harvey et al., 2005). We will
use this approach to create a simulated “thought experiment” (Di
Paolo et al., 2000) that will permit us to investigate, in the most
simplified manner possible, the potential roles of brain size and
sociality in the generation of an individual’s neural complexity,
where we will operationalize it in two ways.
First, we will consider neural complexity to be captured by
Shannon entropy calculated over neural output values. While
it might seem that focusing on Shannon entropy, which is
maximal for uniform distributions, will bring about cognitive
or behavioral randomness, there are actually good reasons to
consider it as a possible measure of complexity. For one, “the
principle of maximum entropy,” which states that the distribution
thatmaximizes Shannon entropy is to be preferred (Jaynes, 1957),
is found to be operational in biological systems. For instance,
maximizing the neural response entropy amplifies mutual
information between the brain activation and incoming stimuli
(Laughlin, 1981). Furthermore, entropy has been suggested as
a possible correlate of consciousness by the “entropic brain
hypothesis” (Carhart-Harris, 2018).1 Additionally, as stated in
more recent work (Candadai et al., 2019), some previous studies
have associated high levels of neural entropy with enhanced
cognitive performance, e.g., improved generalization in motor
learning tasks (Dotov and Froese, 2018).
Second, for analysis of the results, we will complement
the measure derived from information theory with a notion
more closely associated with system dynamics by looking at
the dimension of the attractor in the state spaces of evolved
neural activity. Here, we employ the embedding dimension as a
measure of the effective degrees of freedom or the complexity
of the dynamics (Stam, 2005) of the corresponding agent’s
neural activity (neural states). In order to calculate it, we follow
standard practices of nonlinear time series analysis (Kodba et al.,
2005; Perc, 2006; Froese et al., 2013), by: (1) using mutual
information (MI) to estimate a proper embedding delay τ (Fraser
and Swinney, 1986), and (2) using the false nearest neighbor
(FNN) method to determine a proper embedding dimension m
(Kennel et al., 1992).
Research (Froese and Di Paolo, 2010; Froese et al., 2013;
Campos and Froese, 2017; Candadai et al., 2019; Reséndiz-
Benhumea et al., 2020) suggests that in the absence of in-group
competition,2 it is easier to evolve increased complexity of neural
activity in close interaction with other agents, than to do so
alone by increasing the intrinsic complexity of the neural network
architecture. In the present study, we extend these findings by
focusing on the role of brain size in generating complexity of
neural activity in solitary and social conditions. Our aim is to
show that it is possible for social agents with a smaller neural
1We admit that generalizability of our results needs to be checked with other
possible measures of neural complexity. However, given that a choice of a
particular measure is in itself a challenging endeavor and each of the measures has
advantages and disadvantages for trying to capture any particular phenomenon
(cf. a comparison of 12 different entropy measures for just anesthesia Liang et al.,
2015), we believe using the most straightforward approach for understanding the
fundamental conceptual issues we tackle here is a good starting point.
2In the studies mentioned above and the present study, this feature is built-in given
that selection pressure acts on pairs of agents together, rather than on individuals.
network to exhibit at least the same complexity of neural activity
as a solitary agent with a larger neural network.
2.1. Model
The implementation of the proposed model is based on the
Candadai et al. (2019) model. Here, we evolved agents to
maximize their neural entropy in individual and social scenarios
using a smaller (2-neuron model) and a larger (3-neuron model)
neural networks.
2.1.1. Simulated Agents and Environment
Agents have circular bodies, with a radius of 4 units. Each of them
is provided with: two acoustic sensors, which are symmetrically
positioned in its frontal side at ±45◦ with respect to its central
axis; an acoustic emitter, which is located in its body’s center; and,
two motors, which are driving two wheels in its left and right
sides, respectively, that enable displacement in a 2-dimensional
environment. The environment consists of an empty open-
ended arena.
Each agent emits an acoustic signal and senses the strength
of another agent’s signal, which experiences attenuation
due to distance and “self-shadowing” mechanism (see
Supplementary Material for details).
2.1.2. Neural Architecture
The agent’s neural architecture consists of three fully connected
layers: sensor layer, neuron layer, and actuator layer. In this
work, we study the comparison between 2-neuron and 3-neuron
models. The main difference between them is the number
of neurons in their neuron layer (two and three neurons,
respectively), while their sensor and actuator layers are identical
(see Figure 1).
FIGURE 1 | Agents’ neural architecture and evolutionary conditions, (A)
2-neuron model neural architecture, (B) 3-neuron model neural architecture. In
both of them, sensor nodes, neurons (fully recurrently connected neurons),
and actuator nodes are shown by blue, orange, and purple nodes,
respectively. (C) Evolving solitary agents [Individual Evolution (IE)], (D) Evolving
interacting pair of agents [Social Evolution (SE)].
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The sensor layer consists of two sensor nodes with a sigmoidal
activation function. The inner neuron layer is modeled as
a continuous-time recurrent neural network (CTRNN) (Beer,
1995). In this layer, we are implementing two brain architectures:
the use of two fully recurrently connected neurons for the 2-
neuron model as shown in the Figure 1A, which corresponds
to a 2-dimensional dynamical system; and, the use of three
fully recurrently connected neurons for the 3-neuron model as
shown in the Figure 1B, which corresponds to a 3-dimensional
dynamical system. In both architectures, each neuron’s activity is
governed by the standard CTRNN state equation. The actuator
layer consists of three actuator nodes, two correspond to the left
and right motors for agent locomotion and one corresponds to
the acoustic signal emitter for modulating the strength of the
emitted signal. All actuator nodes are sigmoidal units with no
internal state. Agent locomotion is the result of the effective
control of the twomotors, where net linear velocity is given by the
average of the outputs of the two actuator nodes corresponding to
the right and left motors; and, the angular velocity, which refers
to how fast an agent rotates, is given by their difference divided by
the radius of the agent. The equations for each layer are provided
in the Supplementary Material.
2.1.3. Performance Measure
The measure that we use for evaluating agent’s performance is its
neural entropy. In particular, we select simple multi-dimensional
Shannon entropy calculated on neural output values, as in
the Candadai et al. (2019) model (see Supplementary Material
for details).
2.1.4. Genetic Algorithm
A real-valued genetic algorithm was used to optimize the
parameters of the agents’ neural controllers (i.e., the connection
weights, the time-constants, the biases, and the gains) to
maximize their neural entropy. It is important to highlight that
no particular task was explicitly optimized. For the 2-neuron
and 3-neuron models, each agent had 20 and 30 parameters,
respectively. These parameters were encoded as a real-valued
genotype, where each value was contained in the interval [-1,1]
and scaled during simulation to specific parameter ranges, which
are provided in the Supplementary Material.
The agents were evaluated in each of the 4 independent
trials and their neural outputs recorded in order to calculate
their normalized neural entropy. Each trial lasted 200 simulation
seconds at a step size of 0.1.
Upon ranking the population according to fitness values, the
new population was generated by keeping an elite population
of the top 4% of the existing solutions and by mutating and
crossing over these elite individuals to get the rest of the
new solutions. Mutation was performed by adding zero-mean
Gaussian mutation noise with a variance of 0.1 to the solutions
and crossover involved swapping each parameter between a pair
of solutions with a probability of 0.1.
2.1.5. Experimental Setup
For both brain sizes (2-neuron and 3-neuron models) we evolved
agents in two different evolutionary conditions: individual
and social. Here, we describe the implementation details for
both scenarios.
1. Individual Evolution (IE): We performed 10 independent
runs with an initial random population of 96 solitary agents,
i.e., without an agent partner as shown in Figure 1C. The
parameters for each agent were encoded as a single genotype
(one solution). The solitary agents were not sensing any input,
neither from another agent nor from the environment. For
each trial, the agent’s initial position was set at coordinates
(0, 0). The agent’s heading direction was initialized to the right.
The population was evolved for 2000 generations to maximize
the neural entropy of each solitary agent.
2. Social Evolution (SE): We performed 10 independent runs
with an initial random population of 96 pairs of agents that
were able to interact with each other as shown in Figure 1D.
The parameters for each pair of agents were encoded as a
single genotype (one solution) and were evolved together
during all generations. For each trial, there was a fixed initial
position for each pair of agents: the first agent was always
positioned at coordinates (0, 0), while the second agent was
placed 20 units of distance from the first one, just varying their
relative angle as [0,π/2,π , 3π/2], respectively. Furthermore,
both agents’ heading direction was initialized to the right. The
population was evolved for 2000 generations to maximize the
neural entropy of each pair of agents.
3. RESULTS
In this section, we present the results for the best agents in 2-
neuron and 3-neuron models from the corresponding runs. We
focus on the comparison between 3-neuron agents evolved in
solitary environment (IE) and 2-neuron agents evolved in social
environment (SE).
3.1. Agent Behavior
Figure 2A shows the trajectory of the best agent evolved in the
IE condition in 3-neuron model from the best run. Figure 2B
shows the trajectory of the best pair of agents evolved in
the SE condition in 2-neuron model from the best run. In
the comparison of both images, it can be observed that the
solitary agent exhibits less complex behavior than the pair of
agents in interaction. In the former case, the agent is moving
in simple loops, while in the latter, the agents are enhancing
each other behavior by displaying spiralling nested pairwise
loops movement.
3.2. Statistical Analysis
In order to capture the statistical differences between the
conditions tested, we compared the means of neural entropy of
evolved pairs of agents in the SE conditions against the neural
entropy of evolved agents in the IE conditions, between 2-neuron
and 3-neuron models. Specifically, we took the neural entropy
values from the best agent pair or the best agent in the last
generation of all 10 independent runs in each condition. There
was a significant main effect of condition F(1, 36) = 6.55, p <
0.05 and a significant main effect of the number of neurons
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FIGURE 2 | Behavior of agents during the last 10 simulation seconds of the trial. (A) Trajectory of the best 3-neuron agent evolved in Individual Evolution (IE) condition
from the best run, showing simple loops movement. (B) Trajectories of the best pair of 2-neuron agents evolved in Social Evolution (SE) condition from the best run,
showing spiralling nested pairwise loops movement.
FIGURE 3 | Neural entropy values in all conditions tested: values from the best agent (IE) or agent pair (SE) in the last generation in 10 runs of each condition. Note
that the outlier in SE of 3-neuron model was not removed from the analysis.
F(1, 36) = 4.62, p < 0.05 but no significant interaction effects.
That is, neural entropy was higher in SE condition than in IE
condition, and higher in 3-neuron than in 2-neuron model but
these factors did not affect each other (see Figure 3). Social
interaction between the larger-brained agents did not lead to a
larger (or smaller) neural entropy gain compared to the smaller-
brained agents.
Since we were specifically interested in comparing neural
entropy between agents evolved in social interaction (SE) in a
2-neuron model and agents evolved in isolation (IE) in a 3-
neuron model, we also conducted a Bonferroni-corrected post-
hoc t-test between these two conditions. The difference was not
significant, p = 0.79.
3.3. Nonlinear Time Series Analysis
We performed the nonlinear time series analysis of the
evolved agents’ neural activity (neural states) to determine
their proper embedding delay τ using MI method, and then
their proper embedding dimension m using FNN method (see
Supplementary Material for details).
We distinguished two different testing modes for obtaining
the time series of the evolved agents’ (in IE or SE, respectively)
neural activity: (1) decoupled, when the evolved agent is tested
in isolation (Input = 0); and (2) coupled, when the evolved agent
is tested in the presence of an interactive partner. Furthermore,
we only considered the neural states of neuron 1, trial 1, of the
best agents from each run (10 runs), from 2-neuron and 3-neuron
models, correspondingly, to obtain their embedding dimension.
Our results (see Figure 4) confirmed our hypothesis:
1. By comparing the mean embedding dimension of the neural
states of the coupled 2-neuron agent evolved in SE condition
(2-neuron model, Coupled SE) and the decoupled 3-neuron
agent evolved in IE condition (3-neuron model, Decoupled
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FIGURE 4 | Embedding dimension in all conditions tested: The mean values are presented by gray diamonds. The mean value of the Coupled Social Evolution
(Coupled SE) condition in 2-neuron model is higher than the mean value of the Decoupled Individual Evolution (Decoupled IE) condition in 3-neuron model. Note that,
for both models, in the Coupled SE condition, the mean values are higher than their intrinsic dimensional limitations (i.e., 2-dimensional and 3-dimensional systems,
for the cases of 2-neuron and 3-neuron models, respectively). On the other hand, for both models, in the Decoupled Social Evolution (Decoupled SE) condition, the
mean values are lower than their intrinsic dimensional limitations.
IE), we found that the former was higher dimensional than
the latter, thereby demonstrating that social smaller-brained
agents have at least equivalent (i.e., equal or more) degrees of
freedom of neural activity than isolated larger-brained agents.
2. Importantly, we found that this increase in degrees of freedom
of neural activity in coupled socially evolved agents does not
depend in their intrinsic complexity, as when being decoupled,
their embedding dimension is lower than what can be
achieved. This suggests, in line with previous work (Candadai
et al., 2019; Reséndiz-Benhumea et al., 2020), that agents in
interaction are enhancing each other’s neural complexity.
4. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have investigated the idea that brain size could
decrease because agents could reliably take advantage of social
interaction. A key open question in this regard is whether this
reduction in brain size is made possible because of decreased
cognitive demands (“smart phone, dumb user”), or because of
increased cognitive scaffolding (“doing more with less”).
By performing a statistical analysis, we found that smaller-
brained social agents are able to exhibit comparable levels of
neural complexity, as larger-brained solitary agents. This is in
line with the idea that the brain of an agent in a reliable
social setting can do more with less, and is consistent with
previous findings (Candadai et al., 2019; Reséndiz-Benhumea
et al., 2020). Then, by performing a nonlinear time series analysis,
we found that the embedding dimension of the neural states
of the decoupled neural network is lower when agents evolved
under social condition, which seems to be more in line with
the idea of the brain as a “dumb user.” Therefore, in a way,
both possibilities can co-exist depending on whether we focus on
the topological structure (i.e., number of neurons) or the state
dynamics (i.e., degrees of freedom) of the brain: during evolution
of sociality an individual’s brain topological structure can become
simplified, while its state dynamics can become more complex at
the same time.
An important implication of this computational proof of
concept for the science of brain evolution, whether in humans
or social insects, is that care should be taken when inferring
cognitive capacities from brain size. The coupled brain, as part
of a whole body and environment system, will exhibit neural
dynamics that are underdetermined by the structure of the brain.
There are several limitations to our model that need to
be taken into consideration. First, our simulation involved
separate evolutionary runs for different brain sizes and different
conditions rather than integrating these factors within the same
evolution. An alternative setup would be evolving a population
of solitary large-brained agents and then transitioning them to
a social smaller-brained population. It would be interesting to
examine whether in such a scenario the same types of neural
state spaces would be observed. Conceivably, the process of first
evolving individual agents with a larger, more complex brain
would be in tension with its later simplification once a social
dimension is introduced and brain size is reduced.
Second, an important characteristic of the brain neural
complexity lies in its modular architecture in which the interplay
between specialized (i.e., segregated) and integrated neuronal
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units results in variety and flexibility of cognition. In this
regard, the use of Shannon entropy for measuring complexity is
limited as it does not allow for quantification of such functional
integration among differential neural activities. This can be
addressed by exploring the use of more comprehensive measures
of complexity (Tononi et al., 1994), thereby capturing the utility
of such potential interplay between agent’s neural units on their
evolved behavior.
Third, the lack of input to the agents in isolated condition
was an unrealistic impoverishment in that one could attribute
the higher neural complexity in social than individual evolution
to a richer input provided to the former. This is consistent
with our previous result (Reséndiz-Benhumea et al., 2020) that
evolving an isolated agent in the presence of a non-interactive
“partner” can also lead to high neural complexity. The point
here, however, is not to exclude other factors that might enable
neural complexity.
Fourth, social interaction simulated in our model is of a
relatively simple kind: the agents were evolved always in the
same pairs. It might be argued that our results are due to the
availability of the same reliable partner and that a more realistic
scenario in which they would have to interact with multiple,
more unpredictable partners would not be possible with a smaller
brain. Furthermore, brain size undoubtedly did increase over
most of human evolution (Herculano-Houzel, 2016). We would
like to point out that our work is not intended to deny this
phenomenon but rather to put a more nuanced question into
the spotlight. Namely, that it needs to be investigated what kind
of social (and environmental) conditions lead to what type of
consequences for brain structure and activity. Future work could
explore how our findings scale up to larger groups and different
kinds of social couplings.
Finally, the agents in our simulation did not have any
specific task they were required to solve as we optimized
neural complexity directly. This might make conclusions about
task-related neural complexity as opposed to task-independent
complexity not entirely justified. However, related work by Nagar
et al. (2019) that did include a behavioral task found results
similar to ours.
In addition to raising newmodeling questions, our work leads
to novel hypotheses that could be tested in experimental work.
For instance, it is possible that even though social insects tend
to have smaller brains than solitary insects, the individuals in a
colony may nevertheless exhibit more complex neural activity.
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